

**CONTINGENCY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR NAVIGATIONAL
WARNING SERVICES**

Submitted by IHB

SUMMARY

Executive Summary: This document provides the draft text of a paper on Contingency planning considerations for navigational warning services.

Action to be taken: Paragraph 2

Related documents: None

1. Attached to this document is the draft text prepared by the IMSO delegate following the WWNWS2 meeting.
2. The Sub-Committee is invited to review the text of the document and decide on any further action to be taken.

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CONTINGENCY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR NAVIGATIONAL WARNING SERVICES

1 Purpose

1.1 The continued provision of navigational warnings (NW) is considered essential for the safety of life and property at sea. The circumstances under which each Navigational Warning Co-ordinator operates are different, and it is therefore not possible to provide absolute guidance on what arrangements are appropriate in every case. This document is intended to provide a guide to some of the central issues that should be taken into account and is generally relevant for NAVAREA and National Co-ordinators.

1.2 The purposes of contingency planning in this context are to:

- .1 assess all potential risks, both internal and external, to the continuing operational capability of an NW Co-ordinator; and
- .2 develop, implement and, where appropriate, exercise plans and facilities to mitigate those risks that are assessed as posing a significant potential risk to the NW operation.

2 General Considerations

2.1 In order to be assured that the broadcast of NWs will continue under all foreseeable circumstances, it will be necessary to review every element of and contributor to the successful broadcast of warning messages. This means that it is essential to consider how to ensure continued access to the NW Co-ordinator's office by those who provide raw information to feed the broadcast, and make alternative arrangements for broadcasting the messages in the event that there should be a catastrophic failure of the transmitting station or Land Earth Station (LES), or even of the satellite used for broadcasting warnings. This encompasses a very broad scope of internal and external factors, and Navigational Warning Co-ordinators will need to think creatively in order to review all possible threats to their service and discover the most effective means of dealing with them.

2.2 Clearly, some potential problems will be assessed as being so unlikely that it will neither be sensible nor cost effective to make provision for them. However, it is important to have at least considered such hazards and discarded them only in the face of logical analysis.

3 Key Resources and Capabilities

3.1 Each NW Co-ordinator's office will be unique to some degree but some resources and capabilities are more-or-less common to every situation. These might include:

- .1 communication reception: phones, email, military communications, "snail" mail, etc.; all essential contact methods by which external sources can submit raw information for consideration for broadcast;

- .2 communication transmission: all the methods by which NWs are sent out for broadcast and subsequent publication;
- .3 nautical charts, sailing directions, lists of lights, tide tables, and other essential reference materials;
- .4 address and contact lists;
- .5 operational logs of messages issued, in force and cancelled;
- .6 trained personnel;
- .7 power supplies; and
- .8 broadcast monitoring receivers

3.2 As indicated in para 2.1 above, it will also be essential to consider alternatives to the normal means of broadcast. The International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO) requires Inmarsat to develop and exercise the restoration of essential distress and safety services in each of the Inmarsat Ocean Regions, but parallel arrangements are not normally made by the operators of Inmarsat LESs for restoration of their specific functions, nor by the operators of coast radio stations for the transmissions via HF, MF or VHF.

4 Types of Hazard

It is clearly not possible to list every potential hazard to the continuation of an NW operation, but contingency plans should at least consider the need for a response to fire, flooding, earthquake/landslip, extreme weather, tsunamis, civil action (eg strikes or riots), terrorist action, power failure, sickness or death of key personnel, etc.

5 Mitigation

5.1 The primary method of mitigation for all of these potential hazards will be prior planning. This is essential, since in some cases it will be necessary to establish and agree contractual arrangements, or at least obtain user accounts for access with passwords etc. before alternative sources of supply (e.g. for transmission of NWs) can be implemented. Once a problem of this nature has arisen, it will be too late to seek to make alternative arrangements.

5.2 One of the most effective and efficient means of providing for major failure of an operational NW Co-ordinator's service has been found to be through the prior agreement of mutual support arrangements with a colleague having similar responsibilities for a different area. Note that it is neither essential, nor sometimes desirable that the chosen colleague should be responsible for an adjacent area. The most important aspect of such arrangements is that the selected colleague should be able to broadcast to the same area of sea as the Co-ordinator being supported, via the same Inmarsat satellite in the case of NAVAREA broadcasts. Usually such arrangements provide for mutual support in case of a problem experienced by either party.

5.3 Other means of providing for failure or non-availability of a co-ordinator's own resources that should be considered include on-site duplication of individual capabilities (e.g. computers or broadcast monitoring receivers) or even the establishment of a full duplicate off-site facility. Many NW Co-ordinators have made arrangements to be able to continue their basic operation from home in case they were denied the use of their office for a short period. Others enjoy the comparative luxury of a full off-site back-up facility. In either case, it is necessary to arrange for key electronic back-up files to be made regularly and often, and stored off-site where they can be accessed in the event that they are required.

5.4 Whatever arrangements are chosen, the fundamental principle should be to ensure the continuation of the NW broadcast service for mariners, in the most effective, efficient and cost-effective manner, regardless of what difficulties may arise in the provision of that service.

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